With political consensus reached across Wales and Westminster that the current conferred powers model of Welsh devolution should be replaced with a reserved powers model as exists in Scotland and Northern Ireland, this article looks back at the systems instituted under the Government of Wales Act (2006) and compares it with the proposals contained within the draft Wales Bill (2015) and Wales Bill (2016). This involves an in-depth comparison of the consequences for legislative clarity and robustness of the shift in 2011 from Part III of GoWA 2006, which instituted a system for the ad hoc transfer of powers to the National Assembly, to Part IV, which provides the Assembly with direct primary powers over specific policy areas, and the subsequent comparison of the existing system with the draft bill's proposals. In doing so, two claims are advanced: (i) that the system instituted in Part III of GoWA was actually preferable to that unlocked with the shift to Part IV; and (ii) that this existing system was nevertheless preferable to the proposed reserved power model contained in the draft Wales Bill Ultimately, what the Welsh case illustrates is how constitution building should not be done; and furthermore, that there are inherent problems regarding legislative competence within conferred powers models of devolution, but a reserved powers model is no panacea either.
Devolution has returned to the foreground of UK politics following the 'No' vote in the September 2014 referendum on Scottish independence. While much of this debate has focused on delivering a 'devo-max' settlement for Scotland, plans for 'radical devolution to the great cities of England' (Osborne, 2015) , and arguments about so-called 'English Votes for English Laws' within the Westminster Parliament, major changes are also imminent in Wales. In October 2015 the Conservative Government published the draft Wales Bill, the aim of which is to provide 'a stronger, clearer and fairer devolution for Wales that will stand the test of time' (Wales Office, 2015: 4); this was followed in June 2016 with the new Wales Bill (Wales Office, 2016) . At its core, the Bill proposes a move to replace the current conferred powers model of Welsh devolution with a reserved powers model, as exists in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
In the former model, the central, 'sovereign' parliament (i.e. Westminster) confers powers to a devolved assembly, allowing it to legislate in specifically defined subject areas. In the latter, by contrast, the devolved body is granted the freedom to legislate on any subject area, provided it is not one specifically reserved to the central parliament. This article focuses on an important distinction within the particular conferred powers model instituted by the Government of Wales Act (2006) (hereafter GoWA 2006) . It does so by comparing the consequences for policy robustness and legislative clarity of the shift the preceding LCO model used during the Third Assembly (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) . While these same 'grey spots' existed constitutionally under the LCO system, this article argues that their effects were mitigated by a number of benefits missing from the new system:
It prescribed legislative certainty;
(ii) there was a presumption in favour of devolution;
(iii) and inter-governmental disagreements were 'frontloaded'.
Stating this is not to advocate the cumbersome, opaque and circumlocutory LCO system as a general model, nor recommend its return to Wales. The importance is in illustrating the significant problems inherent to any conferred model of devolution -this overarching model hindering good governance.
At the same time, however, as demonstrated by the proposals contained within the draft Wales Bill, reserved power models of devolution are not inherently better than a conferred powers model. A devolved model based upon the draft Bill's proposals would have entailed another step backwards, for three key reasons:
(i) the restriction of Assembly powers with regards to the Minister of Crown powers;
(ii) a decrease in legislative competence due to the proposal of extensive reservations; and (iii) the introduction of a 'necessity test' related to changes in law on reserved matters and private and criminal law. 
THE ROUTE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF WALES ACT 2006
Multi-layered governance is notorious for being messy (Newton & Van Deth, 2005: 80-81) . It is therefore the job of those constructing constitutions -codified or uncodified -to prescribe the least-worst option. In Wales, the construction of the constitution has been more a case of prescribing the least-worst option to keep the Welsh Labour Party happy as it sought to find a balance between those enthusiastic for, and those sceptical of, the further devolution of powers to Wales (Moon, 2013; . Due to this, good constitutionmaking has often been forgotten in 'the deeply flawed process of Welsh constitution building' (Wyn Jones & Scully, 2012: 56) .
The result has been a system plagued by confusion over legislative competence to the detriment of good governance. Key here has been the conferred powers model that only of a range of specified subjects.
Further complication was added by the fact that the Assembly had to work within the legislative framework of UK Acts, with the Assembly only empowered to make secondary legislation within the fields specifically devolved under GoWA 1998, or where powers had been specifically granted in UK Acts. This already confusing picture was compounded by a lack of codification of the distinction between primary and secondary legislation -a fact manipulated by Westminster governments to either empower, or restrict, the furthering of the Assembly's powers (Laffin et al, 2000: 224) .
The National Assembly for Wales has thus operated throughout its tenure within a form of 'cooperative federalism, with functions shared or concurrent between central and devolved government rather than divided between to two' (ibid). As Entwistle, et al. (2014: 321) suggest, this multi-level system of governance resembles a mixture of both 'layer cake' and 'marble cake' federalism: in the first, there are 'clearly demarcated spheres of activity' and thus 'little need for intergovernmental coordination'; in the second, there is 'an intermingling of roles and responsibilities such that different sectors are governed in some way by more than one and perhaps all tiers of governance at the same time ' (ibid: 311) . This complexity -and confusion over where legislative competencies subsequently lay -has seen a near continuous process of institutional development from the birth of Welsh devolution.
The journey of Welsh Devolution, 1998-2011
The narrative of the debates and key moments in Wales's constitutional development have been outlined in detail numerous times (Rawlings, 2007; Deacon, 2012; Cole & Stafford, 2015: 5-6) . Indeed, as Laura McAllister (2015: 37) notes, the academic focus since devolution has been 'overwhelmingly' focused upon this 'journey', arguably to the detriment of analyses on the practical functioning of policy making processes and governance structures. Nevertheless, to make the latter possible, a broad overview is useful to understand the particular nature of the current devolved settlement. This is not only because Welsh devolution has a tendency to be overlooked in British political debate, but because the aforementioned 'journey' is a vital part of explaining why the problems discussed exist. Act (Trench, 2010: 123) . Coupled with the renaming of 'Secretaries' as 'Ministers', there was a de facto "Westminster-style split" between the legislature -the National Assembly for Wales -and executive -the Welsh Assembly Government (Griffiths & Evans, 2012: 481) .
Arguments that further powers than those included in GoWA 1998 should be devolved to Wales started before the Assembly even opened (Moon, 2014) , and one of the first commitments of Morgan's new Government was the establishment of an independent commission to examine the powers and electoral system of the National Assembly. The resulting commission was chaired by the Labour Peer Ivor Richard who was damning in his critique of the existing "grotesque" system (Wyn Jones & Scully, 2012: 43 or a reserved powers model. These arguments have largely played out around the failures of the post-referendum system. To understand this system and why it was seen as an improvement over the LCO system, the following section outlines how both functioned
and their major problems.
THE GOVERNMENT OF WALES ACT (2006)
GoWA 2006 Table 1 for a summary of key terminology related to GoWA 2006). Part III Set out system by which legislative competency for specific 'Matters' within a series of broad policy areas (labelled 'Fields' -listed in Schedule 5) could be transferred to the National Assembly via the LCO system, allowing it to pass laws, known as 'Assembly Measures', with regards to these Matters.
Part IV Provides the National Assembly with full legislative competency over multiple, broad policy areas (labelled 'Subjects' -listed in Schedule 7) over which it can pass laws, known as 'Acts of the Assembly'.
Schedule 5 Listed the 20 'Fields' within which the National Assembly had powers to make laws on any "Matter" under Part III -was amended incrementally. With regards to the LCO system, these were a form of subordinate legislation which would, on an ad hoc basis, add 'Matters' (i.e. confer responsibility for policy areas) into the fields listed in Schedule 5 over which Measures could subsequently be made by the Assembly (Griffiths & Evans, 2012: 482) . This process, set out in section 95 of GoWA 2006, "was unique to Wales, having no exact parallel in the other devolved administrations of the UK or internationally" (Ibid). The system's purpose was ultimately as a stopgap, meant to ensure devolution would move forward in Wales, but at a pace decided upon by MPs in Westminster (Trench 2010: 129) . It is upon this unique system that the subsequent discussion focuses.
Explaining the LCO System
As set out in Section 95 of GoWA 2006, the process for transferring powers to the National The pre-legislative scrutiny which was undertaken by MPs on the Welsh Affairs Committee was one of the major sticking points for the whole LCO system (Cole & Stafford, 2015: 39) ; the fact that this role was not enshrined in law goes someway to explaining why. An MP's role was uncodified and vague, creating a very real point of friction between MPs, AMs and both governments. As a consequence of this prelegislative examination by MPs, LCOs were 'subject to greater scrutiny than almost any other type of statutory instrument ' (ibid: 489) . This may have made for good Orders;
indeed, the Welsh Affairs Committee argued that 'there is no doubt that almost all the LCOs passed into law have been improved as a result of the scrutiny process' (WAC, 2010: 3) . Others, however, saw this as an overly long bureaucratic process that led to
LCOs only being passed in non-controversial areas (Deacon, 2012: 141) . Indeed, one criticism regularly levelled at the LCO process was its length. Due to the pre-legislative scrutiny in particular, but not exclusively, the whole process -from proposing an Order, to Schedule 5 being amended -could take between six months and two years to
complete.
An attempt was made to clarify the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders in the process itself in the form of Devolution Guidance Note 16 (DGN16); however, tensions remained over one key factor -scrutiny of Welsh Assembly Government policy. In both This was the regular balancing act performed during the process of taking an Order through (ibid). During the Third Assembly, MPs were thus empowered to scrutinise the National Assembly and its executive in a way they had been unable to do during the period of 1999 to 2007 -explaining the 'significant and largely negative political comment' the system attracted (Griffiths & Evans, 2012: 482) .
Welsh Government civil servants interviewed describe how, especially in the early period of the system's existence, there were cases where the UK Government wanted to know Having outlined how the LCO process worked and critiques of the system, it is clear the system was flawed. Griffiths and Evans (2012: 482) celebrated its supersession with the shift to Part IV as 'a merciful end to a bureaucratic and cumbersome process '. Miers (2011: 27) characterised the new powers conferred by the referendum as representing 'a qualitatively different constitutional settlement for Wales', in comparison to that provided under Part III. What is also apparent, however, is that the main issues associated with the LCO system -pre-legislative scrutiny and 'policy vetoes' -were not part of the 2006 Act itself. Rather, it was the processes that grew up around the system which presented the biggest problems for the LCO system as a whole. Indeed, for all their flaws, one key thing the LCO system did provide was clarity around the powers held by the National Assembly.
As the following section demonstrates in its analysis of the post-2011 political system, this was a major benefit for policymaking, ultimately lost with the shift to direct legislative powers unlocked in Part IV of GoWA 2006.
Benefits of the LCO System
Three key positives can be highlighted from the old LCO system: (i) it prescribed legislative certainty;
Each of these positives is explained below, detailing how they were lost following the unlocking of primary powers in 2011. Assembly's competence would grow and not be a constant (Griffiths & Evans, 2012: 499) .
Schedule 7, by contrast, has only been amended twice since 2011 -in 2014 and 2015.
The former of these amendments arguably reduced the National Assembly's competence and was done through a UK Parliamentary Act without the consent of either the National Assembly or Welsh Government (Welsh Government, 2014). The second amendment was done via a mechanism known as a Section 109 Order in Council i (see Table 1 ), in relation to legislative competence on sustainable development (Thomas, 2014) . This shows that the Assembly's competence has more or less stayed the same, with it either being amended for a technical reason or without the consent of the National Assembly.
What the move to Schedule 7 thus, arguably, achieved was to create a scenario where there is no longer an expectation that amendments to the competence of the National Assembly should take place. It is true that the lack of flexibility seen during the Fourth Assembly could be put down to the work of the Silk Commission, which -as detailed below -had been looking at Wales' devolution settlement -and subsequently not wanting to change the settlement until their work was completed. Yet, even if this is the case, devolution following the 2011 referendum became more rigid; and while rigidity is not necessarily a bad thing, in terms of Wales, with its imperfect conferred powers model, rigidity was clearly something to avoid. This is even more the case during periods of party political incongruence (McEwan, et al. 2012) , when different parties are in power at the central and sub-national levels.
(iii) Frontloading of disagreements
Positive and constructive inter-governmental relations are essential in any constitutional system where powers are shared between different layers of government (Keating, 2012) .
The major difference between the LCO system and today's set up is the timing of when these relations become important. As addressed earlier, the difficulties of the LCO system did create problems for the effective working of the policy making process. The problems in the new post-2011 system, however, are arguably more intractable.
Under the LCO system, the UK Government remained 'a major governmental player in its own right' (Trench, 2007: 11) , increasingly taking on a role 'policing' Wales' devolution settlement. The concept of an 'unofficial veto' at Westminster is meant to have evaporated with the powers unlocked by the 2011 referendum. As previously discussed, however, what has changed is the nature of the disagreements: specifically from a question of should the Assembly have these powers, to the question of whether the Assembly has these powers. Also changed is the time at which these arguments occurred. It is within these shifts in the question asked and its timing that the aforementioned veto has simply re-emerged in the form of a 'competence dispute'.
With regards to sound policy making, under the previous system, any 'should' argument would always take place at the beginning of the process. This could lead to intergovernmental disagreements over competencies, and subsequently delays between government departments (WAC, 2010: 26) . As addressed earlier, there could be problems with piloting an LCO through the pre-legislative scrutiny. Nevertheless, the recurring theme was that all disagreements were exclusively at the beginning of the process and settled at its conclusion (Interview with senior civil servant in the Constitutional Affairs department, 2014).
By contrast, currently disagreements can occur at any point in the policy making process; be this during initial discussions over a Bill, if Minister of the Crown consent were required, or after a Bill is published and the UK Government becomes aware of it (maybe having issue with the content). It is also possible that, at the end of the process and once a Bill has been passed by the National Assembly it will be referred to the Supreme Court by the UK Government -as has indeed been the case. This is quite different from the LCO system, when all the disagreements over what powers the devolved body should and would subsequently have, were ironed out in the process of devolving competencies and the National Assembly and Welsh Assembly Government would be given the 'green flag' to actually legislate (Interview, 2014) .
CASE STUDIES: BILLS IN THE BAY
The problems that have arisen in the policy-making process following the loss of these positive elements of the LCO system are illustrated through two major cases of Welsh 
Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Bill.
This study seeks to explain the sources of contention in each case and why they would not necessarily have happened before the 'unlocking' of powers following the 2011 referendum. In examining each case in detail, the inadequateness of the current system as a means of policy legislation is demonstrated alongside the need for a new system that allows the National Assembly to regain the three key positives lost from the move away from the LCO system, without abandoning the full and direct law making powers it has gained.
Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill
The Agricultural Wages Board (AWB) for England and Wales was established by the Agricultural Wages Act 1948. The AWB had powers to set wages, holidays and terms and conditions for those who worked in the agricultural sector in England and Wales is for a devolved purpose; and, (iii) has an effect which is within a devolved area. These tests to see whether a provision is devolved or not are far from clear cut. Welsh Government civil servants interviewed describe the tests as getting "really confusing" (Interview, 2014) . 
Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Bill
The Under the LCO system, when a draft Order was being discussed the need for consent to amend Minister of the Crown functions would be discussed as part of the course (Interview, 2014) . Now, however, there is still an imperative for the Welsh Government to discuss its Bills with the UK Government, even if the provisions of said Bill fall well within the competence devolved under Schedule 7. A key criticism often levelled at the LCO system was that it was not built for a "mature", "grown-up" devolved institution (Moon, 2014) ; the current system, wherein consent from a Minister of the Crown is required for certain provisions, is arguably not actually an improvement over the LCO system in this regard.
Because consent from the Ministers of the Crown had not been forthcoming (The Record, 2013), the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Bill itself had to be amended prior to introduction on 29 January 2013, to make sure it fell within the legislative competence of the National Assembly. This is despite the Welsh Government beginning discussions over consents in February 2012, eleven months prior to the Bill's introduction (Jones, C., 2013: 5) . This is in marked contrast to Scotland, where no requirement exists for the Scottish 
THE DRAFT WALES BILL (2015)
While the This is because, while a move to a reserved powers model was to be generally welcomed, in trying to solve one problem, the Government created others, producing a set of proposals that would decrease the areas over which the National Assembly has legislative competence, while introducing new points of conflict over devolved legislating.
As Robert Thomas (2015) (ii) a decrease in legislative competence due to the proposal of extensive reservations; and.
(iii) the introduction of a 'necessity test' related to changes in law on reserved matters and private and criminal law.
These issues have been discussed in detail in Thomas' briefing document (ibid) , but concise overviews of each are given below, explaining how they relate to the problems surrounding legislative competence discussed in the previous sections. "In terms of the specifics of the reservations, it was an iterative process right across Whitehall; the first time, actually, that every single Government department across Whitehall has been engaged in an exercise thinking about devolution in a structured and coherent way. The request that we put out to our colleagues in Whitehall was, 'What is your interpretation of the current devolution boundary in your departmental areas given the existing legislation?' Now, some of the information we had back-I took a decision to push back on them, saying, 'Do you really think that's reserved?' So, there was a bit of, you know, to-ing and fro-ing. So, the list that has been arrived at is not a fresh draft list, it has been worked through a bit, but I accept that there's probably quite a lot of scope for looking at that again and simplifying it…" (Crabb, quoted in NAW, 2015: 10) Unsurprisingly, when Westminster/Whitehall were asked to interpret their own competence, the result was an extensive list that goes much further than the interpretation of the Welsh Government, National Assembly and arguably Supreme Court. The result of the proposed policy reservations would thus be to claw back power over a range of 'silent subjects' which the National Assembly had previously been granted 'the benefit of the doubt' over following the Supreme Court's 2014 ruling. It must also be noted that even if the proposed reservations did go someway to improve clarity over what is and is not devolved, the additional tests and requirements set out in the draft Bill would actually have made it even harder to determine whether an issue is devolved.
Problems with the draft Wales Bill
This relates to the third major issue with the draft Bill -the 'necessity test', which would be applied 'whenever the Assembly legislates to change the law on reserved matters and private and criminal law' (Thomas, 2015) . Such changes are necessary because, for the Assembly's legislation to be effective, it needs to be legally enforced. The aim of the necessity test is, ostensibly, to provide the latitude necessary for the Assembly to make such changes where deemed necessary, while introducing a boundary that ensures that any modification of private or criminal law by an Assembly Act 'could not go any further than is necessary to achieve its (devolved) purpose' (ibid), preserving the single, unified legal jurisdiction of England and Wales.
If the goal is to decrease the confusion and conflict over where the National Assembly has legislative competence, this proposal was a failure. As Thomas (ibid) Wales and the UK as a whole" (quoted in Thomas, 2015) .
CONCLUSION
Debates around the division of powers within a devolved system are inevitable -even in federal systems such as the United States and Germany. However, the level of scope for disagreement within the current system has severely hampered Welsh governance.
Faced with problems of clarity over competencies, the LCO system, flawed as it was, made the best of a bad situation by allowing powers to be conferred on the National Assembly in an ad hoc but detailed fashion that diminished the remit for inter- is drafted in too general terms to provide clarity regarding competencies; the devolution settlement in Wales thus becomes less clear, more conflict prone and increasingly rigid.
The legislative lesson, lived daily in Cardiff Bay, has been that if powers are to be defined, they must be so as clearly, closely and as unambiguously as possible. LCOs were flawed in many ways; nevertheless, despite their cumbersome nature they provided significant certainty -a point ignored by most critics. The 'grey spots of GoWA' are a produce of Schedule 7 codifying increased ambiguity into the system. Westminster's repeated testing of the National Assembly's legislative competence in the Supreme Court is a clear sign of a failure of the system.
Recognising these facts is not to advocate a return to the also flawed LCO system. That this cumbersome and complicated mechanism provided greater clarity over legislative competence than a system where powers are held directly is symptomatic of the conferred powers model's failings and illustrates it as inferior to reserved powers models.
As the Scottish and Northern Irish examples demonstrate, clearer means exist to provide clarity to Wales' devolution settlement. If the referendum in 2011 ultimately led to one step forward, two steps back, the next step towards clarity and avoiding conflict should be the long recommended (Silk Commission, 2013) and promised (UK Government, 2015) move to a reserved powers model -but one free of the problems identified in the draft Wales Bill.
Thankfully when the Wales Bill (Wales Office, 2016) was finally introduced at the House of Commons in June, it conceded ground on the three key problems in the draft Bill: The list of reserved matters was reduced; the need to gain Minister of the Crown consents to govern lessened; and the necessity test abandoned. Critics identify new and continuing problems (George & Pritchard, 2016; Wyn Jones, 2016) ; nevertheless, the Wales Bill finally appears a step forward -if not a leap -for clarity over legislative competency.
The constitutional development of Welsh devolution is particularly troubled. The issues raised provide a more general lesson, however, important for current discussions over further devolution within England (Carter, 2014) : some systems may deal with them better than others, but there are inherent problems regarding legislative competence within conferred powers models of devolution; nevertheless, reserved powers models are no panacea either. 
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